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1. Mergers and acquisitions: A closer look  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) represent a popular strategy used by firms for many 
years, but the success of this strategy has been limited. In fact, several reviews have shown that, 
on average, firms create little or no value by making acquisitions (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001). 
While there has been a significant amount of research on mergers and acquisitions, there 
appears to be little consensus as to the reasons for outcomes achieved from them (King, Dalton, 
Daily, & Covin, 2004). Herein, we begin by reviewing some of the extant research on mergers 
and acquisitions, identifying the key variables on which the studies have focused. Thereafter, we 
summarize some of the major work on a primary reason for failure—paying too high a 
premium—and discuss why executives often delay too long the divestiture of poorly performing 
businesses that were acquired. Additionally, we examine research suggesting the importance of 
an acquisition capability based on organizational learning from the acquisitions and 
complementary science and technology for strategic renewal. Finally, we end with a discussion 
of the research on cross-border mergers and acquisitions which have become prominent in 
recent years.  
 
2. Research on mergers and acquisitions  
A representative review of the extant research on mergers and acquisitions over the last 
25 years (89 articles) produced a list—available from the authors—of the most common 
variables studied. The top three research variables include:  
 
1. The extent to which the acquisition increased the diversification of the acquiring firm/the 
relatedness of the acquiring firm (58% of the studies);  
2. Firm size or the relative size of the acquired to the acquiring firm (52% of the studies); 
and  
3. The acquisition experience of the acquiring firm (28% of the studies).  
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The method of payment for target firms appeared in 18% of the studies, with more emphasis in 
research after 2004.  
While there are logical arguments to suggest that target firms with greater relatedness to 
an acquiring firm should produce higher performance, existing research provides mixed 
evidence. The recent research by Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000) suggests a curvilinear 
relationship between relatedness and performance. Mixed results from prior research can be 
explained by the fact that few of the studies examined nonlinear relationships.  
The impact of firm size on acquisition performance likely results from the effectiveness of 
the integration process, with integration being more difficult for larger acquisitions. Yet, the 
acquired firm must be large enough to have an impact on the acquiring firm’s performance (King, 
Slotegraaf, & Kesner, 2008). While a complex relationship, research findings for firm size are 
more consistent than for many of the other variables.  
Acquisition experience has been the subject of study for a number of years because of its 
assumed importance. Yet, the more critical issue is likely to be the amount learned from making 
an acquisition. Obviously, a firm with some experience should be able to learn from additional 
acquisitions, but having more experience does not ensure that greater learning occurs. Early 
experiences can produce more learning than later experiences but without adequate absorptive 
capacity, early lessons may be generalized to subsequent acquisitions to which they are not 
applicable. Thus, the relationship between experience and learning is likely to be curvilinear but 
also even more complex (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). While prior research and its 
conclusions are useful, increased utilization of a common set of variables in M&A research could 
minimize model under-specification and facilitate achieving greater consensus on the drivers of 
acquisition performance. This being the case, we still need to learn more about the requirements 
for making successful acquisitions; toward that end, we examine next some factors that 
contribute to acquisition failure and success.  
 
3. Acquisition premiums  
While the acquisition premium has been identified as a significant variable (Krishnan, Hitt, 
& Park, 2007; Sirower, 1997), it has been examined in only a minority of M&A studies. An 
acquisition premium is the price paid for a target firm that exceeds its pre-acquisition market 
value. Over the past 20 years, the average premium paid has been 40%-50% (Laamanen, 2007). 
The justification for a premium is the potential synergy that can be created in the merger of the 
two firms. A premium is paid to entice the target firm shareholders to sell to the acquiring firm. 
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However, the premium paid should not and cannot be greater than the potential synergy if the 
acquisition is to produce positive returns. Of course, it is difficult to predict the value that can be 
created by synergy, and it is often difficult to realize the potential synergy because of the 
challenges of achieving integration (Sirower, 1997).  
There are other reasons that acquiring firms pay large premiums. One such reason stems 
from agency factors when top executives engage in opportunistic behavior that provides them 
personal gains (Trautwein, 1990). Because acquisitions increase the size of a firm, they often 
have a positive effect on a top executive’s compensation and enhance his/her power. 
Furthermore, if the acquisition diversifies the firm, it may also reduce that top executive’s 
employment risk. Because these are personal gains that rarely produce positive returns for the 
acquiring firm, acquisitions made for these purposes are unlikely to be successful.  
Another reason for high premiums is executive hubris (Roll, 1986). In this context, hubris 
is executives’ overconfidence that they can achieve the synergy projected when the firm is 
acquired and integrated. Yet, firms acquired where hubris is a major factor are unlikely to 
achieve the needed synergy. As a result, firms may pay too high a premium and are unable to 
earn adequate returns to compensate for the premium and also produce a positive return 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). When hubris is instrumental in the acquisition, it is not uncommon 
for the CEO to do a less than adequate job of due diligence or to ignore negative information 
provided by the due diligence process (Hitt et al., 2001).  
However, Sirower (1997) downplays hubris as a primary factor in paying too high a 
premium for a target. Rather, he suggests three alternative causes for overpayment: (1) 
unfamiliarity with critical elements of the acquisition strategy, (2) lack of adequate knowledge of 
the target, and (3) unexpected problems that occur in the integration process. Overpayment may 
also result from decision biases; for example, Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) found that the 
majority of acquisition announcements use a target firm’s 52-week trading high to determine 
acquisition premiums. Still, while an unsuccessful acquisition may be due to a lack of capabilities 
or experience on the part of the executive, an assumption on the part of managers that they can 
make a deal work (hubris) likely plays a role in premium overpayments.  
Other factors can also influence premiums paid. For example, relationships between 
individuals in the two firms may lead to higher premiums, especially if those relationships are 
board interlocks (Haunschild, 1994). Of course, multiple bidders for a particular target also drive 
up the premiums paid for an acquisition. These cases have been termed the winner’s curse, 
whereby the acquirer with the winning bid often overestimates a target firm’s value (Coff, 2002).  
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Most of the research suggests that paying high premiums is likely to result in negative 
performance of the firm, due to an inability to earn adequate returns beyond the premiums paid 
(Datta, Narayanan, & Pinches, 1992). A large premium places a major burden on managers of 
the acquiring firm to recoup those costs and extract sufficient synergies from the merged firm. 
Research suggests that about 70% of acquiring firms fail to deliver the necessary results to 
recoup the premium payment (Sirower, 1997). Because managers in the acquiring firm face 
tremendous pressure, they are likely to take additional actions in attempt to garner positive 
returns. For example, they frequently engage in restructuring processes to consolidate assets 
and sell off others that are considered redundant (Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997). This 
restructuring action basically results in operational synergy, but it is often inadequate to recoup 
the high costs of the acquisition because of large premiums. Under such conditions, managers 
then often engage in more risky actions designed to reduce costs and increase cash flows from 
the acquisition. For example, a common action is large-scale workforce reductions (Krishnan et 
al., 2007). Unfortunately, employee turnover erodes the human capital in firms, reduces the 
performance of the acquiring firm (Cording, Christman, & King, 2008), and harms the long-term 
value of the acquired firm’s assets.  
 
4. Divestiture of acquired businesses  
When acquisitions are unsuccessful, it may be wise to divest a business rather than 
continue to suffer losses from that acquired business. For example, after several years of 
experiencing losses, Daimler-Chrysler divested the Chrysler assets, even though it had to do so 
at a significant loss from what it originally paid to acquire Chrysler. Some argue that 
DaimlerChrysler should have sold Chrysler much sooner to avoid suffering those losses, as it 
may have been able to obtain a higher price for the Chrysler assets. In fact, Time Warner also 
suffered criticism for several years suggesting the need to divest AOL, even if it had to do so at a 
loss. Recently, the company announced that the AOL assets would be spun off from the parent 
firm.  
While important, there has been a dearth of research on divestitures of acquired 
businesses (Brauer, 2006). A decision to divest an acquired business is essentially reversing a 
major strategic decision made earlier, often by the same executive. Therefore, the divestiture 
decision is influenced by various psychological and organizational factors (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). 
Yet, because of the high rate of failure associated with acquisitions, eventual divestiture of 
acquired businesses is not uncommon. For example, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) found that 44% 
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of the acquisitions they studied were eventually divested. Acquired firms are likely to be divested 
when the acquired unit is performing poorly, but also when organizational inertia to maintain the 
acquisition is low, when the business unit is smaller, and when the acquired firm is young and 
small. Also, when parent firms have divestiture experience, they are more likely to divest 
acquired businesses (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005).  
Oftentimes, executives escalate their commitment to the prior decisions and try to avoid 
divesting the business (Shimizu, 2007). However, when the acquiring firm’s overall performance 
is strong and it has higher slack, executives are often more willing to divest poorly performing 
acquired businesses (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). Certainly, acquired businesses that are 
performing poorly are more likely to be divested when there is a change in the CEO and when 
more independent directors are added to the board. Thus, there are a number of non-business 
factors that contribute to making decisions to divest businesses that have not produced the 
synergy and positive returns predicted when they were acquired.  
 
5. Acquisition capability development  
There are at least two important types of learning in acquisitions. Drawing from success 
or failure experiences, firms can learn to (1) select better future targets, and (2) improve their 
integration processes for future acquisitions. We referred to this type of learning earlier. In this 
section, we also examine learning from the target firm, especially after it is acquired.  
While relatedness between the target and acquiring firms is important, research has 
shown that synergy is created largely by complementary capabilities. Complementary 
capabilities are different abilities which fit or work well together. Although the integration of 
complementary capabilities is an important criterion for success in acquisitions, much of the 
knowledge underlying these capabilities is tacit. Furthermore, the true value to an acquiring firm 
can only be captured if the valuable capabilities in the acquired firm are fully integrated into and 
absorbed by the acquiring firm. This requires that the acquiring firm learn the new and valuable 
knowledge stocks held by the acquired firm. If the acquiring firm is able to learn and absorb the 
knowledge, thereby integrating it with its own knowledge stocks, it can create new and possibly 
even more valuable capabilities. Thus, the learning that occurs in the acquisition process and the 
integration thereafter is crucial to its success (Hitt et al., 2001). In fact, some firms have had 
significant success in making acquisitions, and this success can be at least partially attributed to 
their ability to learn from the acquired firms and to absorb and integrate the new knowledge in 
order to build new capabilities. Two examples of such companies are Cisco Systems and 
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General Electric.  
While at a coarse-grained level, a positive linear relationship has been argued to exist 
between acquisition experience and performance (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema & 
Schijven, 2008a, 2008b). At the same time, others have noted that the relationship is likely 
curvilinear (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Reuer, in press). The differences in results of 
studies examining the relationships suggest that other factors are likely involved. While 
experience suggests learning, it is a coarse-grained proxy for it. And, there are many factors that 
likely affect the firm’s ability to learn as it gains experience.  
Organizational learning in acquisitions is highly complex. First, there is the opportunity to 
transfer experience into situations where it does not apply. For example, transferring acquisition 
routines from one industry to another may not be effective. Essentially, the firm must learn to 
adapt the knowledge gained to the context in which it is applied (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). 
Certainly, when the organizations are too homogeneous, very little learning can occur. Thus, 
heterogeneity or differences between the firms is necessary for firms to acquire new knowledge 
(Hayward, 2002). Alternatively, the firm must have adequate absorptive capacity in order to learn 
the knowledge, so there must be some homogeneous elements that allow it to learn and 
integrate the new knowledge.  
Firms can institute processes by which they deliberately learn. For example, Haleblian, 
Kim, and Rajagopalan (2006) argue that learning can be enhanced through an active process of 
evaluating performance feedback from recent acquisitions. Of course, managers must then 
analyze the acquisitions to understand the factors leading to the performance, regardless of 
whether it is positive or negative. If the performance is strong, the routines used seemingly work; 
if the performance is poor, however, they must be reevaluated and perhaps changed.  
A third mechanism for learning is that of observing, and learning from, others. This is 
often referred to as vicarious learning (Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Such learning tends to be 
more exploratory than the mere exploitation of their current knowledge stocks gained from prior 
experience. It also often occurs through board interlocks and the acquisition experience of the 
firms on which their board members serve (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). The bottom line is 
that firms can learn from acquisitions, and probably must do so in order to gain the greatest value 
from them.  
 
6. Technological learning in acquisitions  
Innovation has become an increasingly important source of value creation in many 
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industries. The importance of innovation has been heightened by rapid technological change and 
growing knowledge intensity in industries. Because of these factors, innovation must come faster 
and there is a higher need for novel solutions, especially in high-technology industries. Thus, 
firms have turned to mergers and acquisitions as an alternative strategy for obtaining the 
knowledge necessary to create innovations with the speed needed and the novelty necessary to 
either maintain a competitive advantage or to build a new one (King et al., 2008; Makri, Hitt, & 
Lane, in press; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006). While some research suggests that 
acquisitions may produce a reduction in innovation output over time (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1996), if a target with complementary capabilities is selected, acquisitions have the 
opportunity to develop novel knowledge and to enhance the innovative output of an acquiring 
firm.  
A key element in the positive effect of acquisitions on innovation is the knowledge 
relatedness between the acquiring and acquired firms and, of course, the ability to integrate the 
knowledge into the acquiring firm (Cloodt, Hagedoorn, & Van Kranenburg, 2006). Makri et al. (in 
press) examined the knowledge relatedness between acquiring and acquired firms in 
high-technology industries. Their study emphasizes the importance of knowledge 
complementarities between targets and acquirers, and suggests that firms in high-technology 
industries have a higher likelihood of achieving novel inventions if they can identify and acquire 
businesses that have scientific and technological knowledge that is complementary to their own. 
The study found that the effects of knowledge complementarities are strongest when both 
science and technology complementarities are combined; the integration of the two enhances 
innovation quality and novelty.  
The synergistic relationship between science and technology is based partly on the role 
of science knowledge in the innovation process. Science knowledge provides the base for the 
technological knowledge which is normally more focused on providing solutions to problems 
(application). Thus, science enables a better understanding of a problem at hand whereas 
technology helps to resolve those problems. Oftentimes, combining science knowledge from two 
firms can help to produce more novel innovations, while combining technological knowledge 
often leads to more incremental innovations. However, the combination of scientific and 
technological complementarities in acquisitions is quite complex and challenging. In general, if 
the acquiring and acquired firms possess similar knowledge stocks, the resulting innovations are 
likely to be incremental. Certainly, it is helpful to have some similar knowledge stocks in order for 
the acquiring firm to absorb other complementary knowledge stocks. Thus, managers of firms 
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must manage effectively the breadth and depth of their own scientific and technological 
knowledge, but also find ways to incorporate new knowledge in order to survive over the long 
term. There are biases toward incremental innovations, partly because they provide short-term 
returns and are less risky (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Yet, firms must seek 
the more novel and complementary knowledge stocks in order to create unique knowledge that 
leads to novel products and services over time. Another possible form of complementarity is 
combining different geographic operations (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009); as such, we discuss 
cross-border M&A next.  
 
7. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions  
In waves of mergers and acquisitions during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number 
of cross-border acquisitions has increased greatly (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). 
These acquisitions are often made for similar reasons as domestic acquisitions, but they also 
broaden the reach of firms and allow them to effectively enter and/or enrich their competitive 
position within international markets (Brakman, Garita, Garretsen, & Marrewijk, 2008). Much of 
the prior research has examined cross-border acquisitions as a means of entering foreign 
markets, compared to using joint ventures or Greenfield ventures (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 
2000). Some have argued that cross-border acquisitions actually reduce the transaction costs 
involved in entering new markets (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000).  
While cross-border acquisitions may reduce certain types of costs, they still must 
overcome the costs associated with the liability of foreignness in the host country; this includes 
knowledge about the different culture, area regulations, and the pervasive business norms of the 
location. Acquisitions help to overcome this liability because the acquired firm should have the 
local knowledge needed, assuming that the acquiring firm can capture this knowledge in making 
the acquisition (Eden & Miller, 2004).  
More recently, scholars have used institutional theory to help understand how country 
institutions affect firms’ choice of market entry and the performance outcomes of different modes 
of entry (Brouthers, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Research by Zhu, Hitt, Eden, and Tihanyi (2009) 
found that acquiring firms are likely to create more value when the firms acquired are based in 
countries with lower risks. In particular, firms are better able to achieve synergy when the 
institutions of the host country are more similar to the institutions in the acquiring firm’s home 
country. Clearly, however, firms based in developed countries that acquire firms in emerging 
market countries commonly transfer knowledge stocks to the firms in the host country. This is 
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likely to benefit more the firm in the host country than the acquiring firm, unless the newly 
acquired firm can be effectively integrated into the acquiring firm (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The 
acquiring firm is more willing to transfer these knowledge stocks because they have acquired the 
firm’s assets and thus control the use of this knowledge, whereas the firm is less likely to do so in 
international joint ventures where they have lower control over how that knowledge is used and 
where it is applied. Obviously, integration is a critical element and is more complex and 
challenging when the institutions differ greatly between the home and host countries 
(Chakrabarti, Jayaraman, & Mukherjee, 2009).  
 
8. Conclusions  
Mergers and acquisitions have long been a popular strategy, and are increasingly 
common in many industries. This strategy has been employed by both large and small firms, and 
by established and newer firms. While at one time M&A was largely a strategy used by U.S. and 
Western European firms, it has become much more common in other regions of the world, and 
especially in acquisitions that cross country borders. While popular with many executives, it is a 
highly complex strategy and one that is fraught with risk. In fact, even though the strategy has 
been employed for several years and studied by countless scholars, a large number of 
acquisitions fail to produce the results promised.  
Herein, we have explored some of the reasons why acquisitions fail and have suggested 
ways for firms to increase the probability of acquisition success. Certainly, firms must make 
careful selections of their acquisition targets and try not to pay too high a premium; if they select 
the wrong firm or the premium paid is too large, the likelihood of failure is high. Yet, if firms 
search for and identify targets that have complementary capabilities and put in place 
mechanisms that enrich their learning from the acquired firm, they are more likely to build new 
capabilities and enhance their own competitive position in the market. In sum, mergers and 
acquisitions can sometimes be a highly effective and successful strategy, but this strategy must 
be very carefully designed and implemented.  
 
Notes 
• 
a Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, 4113 TAMU, College Station, TX 
77843-4113, U.S.A.  
• 
b Marquette University  
• 
c Xavier University  
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• 
d University of Miami  
• 
e Texas A&M University  
• 
fUniversity of Texas at San Antonio  
• 
gChinese University of Hong Kong  
• *Corresponding author. E-mail address: mhitt@mays.tamu.edu (M.A. Hitt).  
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